A Case For Ethical Veganism: Intuitive And Methodological Considerations by Mcpherson, Tristram
 
A Case for Ethical Veganism:  
Intuitive and methodological considerations. 
 
Tristram McPherson 
Virginia Tech Department of Philosophy 
tristram@vt.edu   
 
Penultimate Manuscript for Journal of Moral Philosophy 









This paper begins by setting out an intuitive case for ethical veganism: the 
thesis that it is typically wrong to consume animal products, that begins with 
the intuitive claim that it is wrong to set fire to a cat. I then raise a 
methodological challenge: this is an intuitive argument for a revisionary 
conclusion. Even if we grant that we cannot both believe that it is permissible 
to drink milk, and that it is wrong to set fire to cats, this leaves open the 
question of which of these judgments we should abandon. I consider and reject 
three strategies for addressing this question: more methodologically naïve 
moral theorizing, appeal to systematic normative theory, and attacking non-
moral presuppositions. I argue that philosophically satisfying resolution of the 
conflict requires debunking our grounds for belief in one of the conflicting 
claims. Finally, I argue that ethical veganism is supported by consideration of 
the most salient debunking arguments available.   
 


















One of the central features of human life is that we interact with non-human animals. We 
observe them; we occasionally compete with them for resources; some of us form 
relationships with them as pets; and almost all of us eat, wear, and otherwise use products 
made from them or by them. This paper argues that the latter interactions are morally 
problematic: it is typically wrong to use or eat products made from or by certain familiar 
non-human mammals, including cats, dogs, cows, pigs, sheep, and deer. 
I call this thesis ethical veganism. This thesis is weaker than standard forms of 
veganism in two respects. First, I argue that it is typically wrong to use animal products, 
but I do not think that this prohibition is exceptionless. Second, my argument rests in part 
on animals’ capacity to suffer. In this paper, I do not address the difficult question of how 
far this capacity – and hence the scope of my argument – might be extended from the 
familiar mammals mentioned to various other species. However, it certainly does not apply 
to the entire animal kingdom, as some readings of veganism would require. For example, I 
am certain that it does not apply to bivalves, which lack a brain, or sponges, which entirely 
lack a nervous system.1 For convenience, I will nonetheless use the word ‘animals’ to refer 
to the familiar mammals listed above.  
The paper begins by sketching a direct intuitive argument for ethical veganism (§1-
2). This thesis is revisionary: using animal products is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and 
one that appears morally innocuous to most of us. I show that this fact poses a neglected 
but important methodological objection to direct intuitive arguments for veganism: at best, 
such an argument can show that some of our intuitive judgments about animal ethics are 
inconsistent. This does not yet show that ethical veganism is the uniquely reasonable 
resolution of this inconsistency (§3). In §4, I consider strategies for resolving the intuitive 
inconsistency. I argue that part of the most philosophically satisfying way to do so appeals 
to asymmetries in the debunking arguments available to undercut the intuitive judgments 
that ground the opposing positions. In §5 I argue that ethical veganism is supported by the 
greater plausibility of the debunking argument available to it. I conclude that veganism is 
supported by the balance of evidence.  
                                               
1 For a case for using ‘vegan’ in something closer to the sense that I intend, see Cox 2010.  
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This paper is structured as an extended argument for that conclusion. However, it 
can also be read as a case study in the methodology of applied ethics. There are prima facie 
attractive intuitive arguments for many revisionary views in applied ethics. These 
arguments will potentially face methodological challenges parallel to the one that I pose to 
the vegan in §3. The details of how best to assess such challenges will vary in crucial detail 
from case to case. However, the discussion of §4 and §5 provides a framework and a model 
for addressing such cases.  
     
1. The intuitive case against causing animal suffering 
 
Some leading discussions of animal ethics implicitly or explicitly presuppose a systematic 
normative ethical framework.2 The argument of this section and the next will instead 
deploy a familiar model of philosophical theorizing: what I will call the intuitive-explanatory 
model. On this model, one appeals to intuitively compelling judgments about clear cases, 
and seeks to construct local ethical principles capable of explaining the truth of those 
judgments, without appeal to systematic normative or metaethical theory, or more 
complex methodological strictures.3   
 This section argues that it is typically wrong to cause animal suffering. The 
argument begins with an intuitively compelling claim about a case:  
Cat  It is wrong to pour gasoline on a cat and light it on fire.4 
Like most of the other ethical claims that I will be making in this paper, Cat should be read 
as including an implicit ‘other things being equal’ clause. Things would not be equal, for 
example, in the following variant on one of Bernard Williams’ famous examples (1973, 98-
9): suppose a militia captain credibly threatens Jane that he will refrain from executing 
thirty innocent villagers just in case she sets his cat on fire. I take it that Jane should 
obviously set the cat on fire, and I do not intend Cat to be incompatible with this 
conclusion. To make the plausibility of Cat vivid, suppose that I came to a philosophy 
                                               
2 Explicit examples include Baxter 1974, Regan 1983, Korsgaard 2004, Wood 1998, and Rachels 2011. It is 
more controversial to ascribe implicit appeals to systematic normative frameworks, but I think that certain of 
the arguments in Singer 1977 and Norcross 2004, for example, make the most sense if we presuppose the 
consequentialist framework that the authors of these articles accept.  
3 Many of the moves in the argument of this section and the next are familiar in the literature. They overlap 
most substantially with parts of Rachels 1997, DeGrazia 1996 and 2009, and McMahan 2008. 
4 Harman 1977 uses a similar example for very different purposes. 
McPherson A Case for Ethical Veganism 3 
conference with a kitten, gasoline, and matches, and announced my intention of testing 
philosophers’ intuitive moral judgments with a real-life case. I would be shocked if my 
colleagues were not moved en masse to stop me.  
 Supposing that Cat is true, what is the best explanation of this fact? Some views 
suggest that one can explain the truth of Cat without suggesting that animal suffering is 
really what matters morally. Consider two such views. Immanuel Kant suggests that 
cruelty to animals is wrong because it is “…demeaning to ourselves” (1997, 27:710 [434]). 
Another view suggests that being cruel to animals is objectionable because it tends to make 
you callous, and thus apt to be cruel to humans.5  
Perhaps cruelty to animals is typically objectionable in part for these reasons. 
However, these explanations cannot explain the full range of our relevant intuitive 
judgments involving Cat.6 Consider one example. Imagine a video game – Cat Torturer! – in 
which players score points by playing at torturing cats in a variety of increasingly nasty and 
vividly rendered ways. As I understand Kant, he would take playing Cat Torturer! for 
enjoyment to be demeaning to oneself. Further, consistently playing Cat Torturer! might 
well foster callousness in players towards the suffering of humans. However, there appears 
to be a striking moral difference between playing Cat Torturer! and actually pouring gasoline 
on a cat and lighting it on fire. The latter action appears worse exactly because it causes 
horrendous suffering to an actual cat. This example suggests that the views just mentioned 
ignore part of the best explanation for the truth of Cat. This is that animal suffering is 
intrinsically morally significant in a way that can explain why causing an animal to suffer is 
morally wrong. The rest of this section develops the case for this explanation.  
My explanation appeals to suffering, which is a complex phenomenon. I take it that 
humans can suffer in ways that non-human animals cannot. However, I take it that it is 
plausible that humans and the animals I discuss are both capable of what I will call visceral 
suffering: being in the sort of pain caused by physical injury, and being averse to that state. I 
will assume the slightly controversial thesis that animals are capable of visceral suffering. (I 
return to this assumption in §4.) 
                                               
5 The empirical case for this latter suggestion is unclear. For a brief discussion, see Herzog 2010, 31-7, and 
the papers cited there. 
6 For a quite different, Kantian case against Kant’s stated view, see Korsgaard 2004. 
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The claim that animal suffering is intrinsically morally significant fits smoothly with 
an attractive general account of the normative significance of suffering. Imagine that you 
are doing some amateur carpentry, and pause to consider the possibility of smashing one of 
your fingers with a hammer. Suffering the throbbing pain of an injured finger would 
typically be intrinsically bad for you. What this state would be like gives you reasons to 
hammer cautiously. And it helps to explain why it would be wrong for me to smash your 
fingers.  
These explanations are not exhaustive, for at least two sorts of reasons. First, the 
wrongness of an instance of causing suffering can be outweighed or undercut by other 
features of that instance. For example, consider a dentist performing a painful but needed 
root canal on a consenting patient, or a coach pushing an athlete through a grueling training 
regimen. Second, my smashing your fingers may typically be morally objectionable for 
reasons beyond the suffering it causes. For example, it may express disrespect for your 
person, or some other vicious attitude or trait, and it may interfere objectionably with your 
agency. My claim, compatible with these points, is that causing visceral suffering is 
typically sufficient to explain the wrongness of an act.  
To see this, compare two ways to express disrespect for someone, and interfere 
with his agency. On the one hand, you may inflict significant pain on him. On the other, 
you may insult him repeatedly in a loud and distracting way. Suppose that such insult is 
disrespectful and interferes with his agency, but does not cause him to suffer. If these were 
your two morally best choices (for example, because otherwise, Williams’ malevolent 
militia captain executes both of you) you would surely typically be required to insult rather 
than inflict suffering. The most natural explanation of this fact is that the way it feels to 
suffer can suffice to explain the wrongness of inflicting significant suffering, independently 
of considerations of disrespect and interference (compare Rachels 2011, 883-4).  
This plausible explanation of the wrongness of inflicting visceral suffering makes it 
very difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is typically wrong to inflict visceral suffering on 
animals. This is because the very feature that suffices to (nonexhaustively) explain the 
wrongness of causing visceral suffering in humans (the way such suffering feels) is by 
hypothesis present in cases of inflicting suffering on animals. This explanation also helps to 
explain our thinking about a range of cases involving animals. Thus, many of us think that 
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practices like dogfighting and cockfighting are wrong. Similarly, many people who take it 
to be permissible to kill and eat animals nonetheless take the conditions of contemporary 
factory farming to be morally problematic. The central feature of factory farms that people 
find morally horrifying is the suffering that such farms inflict upon animals.7  
This section began with a plausible intuitive judgment – Cat – and argued that the 
best explanation of the truth of this judgment is that the way it feels to suffer can 
adequately (but not exhaustively) explain why it is wrong to cause suffering. The next 
section builds on this conclusion to complete my intuitive case for ethical veganism.  
 
2. The intuitive-explanatory case for veganism 
 
In this section, I argue for veganism in two stages. First, I argue for the wrongness of killing 
animals. Then, I argue that this entails that we should adopt a vegan lifestyle.   
 One might accept that it is wrong to cause animals to suffer, but deny that is 
wrong to kill animals. This combination of views underwrites the position of one sort of 
ethical omnivore (compare e.g. Pollan 2006, Ch. 17). This ethical omnivore argues that it is 
objectionable to consume many of the animal products that we do consume. However, this 
is because those products are produced by institutions that cause egregious animal 
suffering. Find a farm that allows a cow to graze, rather than restricting its movement in a 
tiny stall, and that slaughters its animals humanely rather than in a terrifying and painful 
manner, and it is morally acceptable to drink the milk and eat the meat that comes from 
that farm. 
The resulting view can appear intuitively attractive. On the one hand, by insisting 
that animal suffering is intrinsically morally objectionable, the ethical omnivore can accept 
the case for Cat suggested in the previous section. It can also explain why the standard 
methods of raising veal are objectionable,8 why we should condemn slaughterhouse 
dismemberment of live animals, leg-hold traps, dogfighting, and foie gras. On the other 
hand, by denying that animal death is intrinsically morally objectionable, the view avoids  
                                               
7 For a brief summary of some of the relevant facts, see Singer and Mason 2007, Ch.4.  
8  Veal calves are typically raised in pens designed to be so small that they are effectively prevented from 
moving and thus from developing muscle tone, and they are also given a diet that purposefully malnourishes 
them. Together, these factors lead to their short lives being characterized by manifest distress, injury and 
sickness. 
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banning all animal products from our tables. Further, our judgments about the wrongness 
of killing animals are in general weaker and less clear than our judgments about causing 
animal suffering, so it can seem that there is a small intuitive price to pay for these 
attractive results.  
  Despite these attractions, I think that underlying premise of the ethical omnivore’s 
view is indefensible. This is the claim that while animal suffering is morally objectionable, 
painless animal death is not. The difficulty with this claim can be brought out by 
considering a pair of cases, and developing a plausible partial account of the wrongness of 
killing that is the best explanation of our judgments about these cases. 
First, suppose that one has an inspired idea for an art film. The film, however, 
would require performing a painful and unnecessary medical operation on a cow. If the 
suffering of animals is objectionable (as I have argued and our ethical omnivore grants), 
then there is a substantial moral objection to producing this film. Second, suppose that in 
order to save a different cow’s life, one would need to perform an equally painful 
operation on the cow. If the cow would go on to have a long and flourishing cow life after 
the operation, this operation seems to be wholly unobjectionable and perhaps morally 
laudable.  
This pair of cases shows something important: it can be (at least) permissible to 
cause suffering to an animal exactly because doing so is necessary to save its life. This 
suggests that the life of an animal is morally important: saving it can suffice to make an act 
that is typically impermissible (causing the animal to suffer) permissible. This point is clear, 
and very difficult to plausibly square with the claim that it is typically morally permissible 
to kill an animal. If killing an animal is unobjectionable, then why should saving its life give 
you sufficient reason to cause otherwise wrongful suffering (compare McMahan 2008, 67)?  
Further, the best explanation of our judgments about this thought-experiment is 
provided by a plausible partial account of the wrongness of killing. Just as with the question 
of why it is wrong to cause humans to suffer, the correct story of why it is wrong to kill us 
will involve many elements. For example, killing a person typically interferes with their 
autonomy, understood here as their ability to choose and live the life that they value, to the 
best of their abilities. Killing is also typically inconsistent with adequate respect for that 
autonomy: it interferes radically with the victim’s life in a way that they have not consented 
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to. If we assume that animals do not have autonomous plans, killing them painlessly is not 
objectionable in these ways.  
There is another important reason why it is typically wrong to kill a person: killing 
typically deprives the victim of an objectively valuable future.9 That is, killing someone 
deprives them of the valuable experiences activities, projects, etc. that they would 
otherwise have had. The force of this explanation of the wrongness of killing can be 
brought out by considering cases of life-extending killings (Lippert-Rasmussen 2001). For 
example, suppose that there is a drug that, if taken, is known to damage one’s heart such 
that one dies quickly, painlessly, and unavoidably, a year after ingestion. Ordinarily, giving 
you such a drug would simply be wrongful killing. However, suppose next that this drug is 
the only antidote to a poison that you have just accidentally ingested, which will otherwise 
kill you within the hour. Suppose finally that I administer the drug to you while you are 
unconscious from the poison, and sure enough, it extends your life, but causes you to die 
of heart failure a year later.  
In this case the drug that I administered is the cause of your death in one clear 
sense. The coroner, in explaining why you died, would correctly point to the drug that I 
administered. Giving you the drug caused your death, and hence killed you. And yet, it 
simultaneously neutralized the poison and hence extended your life. This does not seem to 
be a case of wrongful killing. The crucial difference between this case and the ordinary case 
of life-shortening killing is that in the latter case, administering the drug deprives you of 
the presumably valuable future that you otherwise would have had, while in the former 
case, it increases the valuable future available to you. The best explanation for why life-
extending killing in such a case seems distinctively unobjectionable is that an important part 
of what makes killing wrong is that it deprives the victim of a valuable future.   
One might object that in this case my beneficent intentions do the crucial 
explanatory work. I agree that intentions may help to explain the wrongness of some 
actions, but this does not undermine the point made here. To see this, consider two cases 
where I give you the drug: an ordinary life-shortening poisoning, and the life-extending 
case just described. Suppose that in both cases I only administer the drug because I have 
                                               
9 Readers will be reminded of Marquis 1989. Marquis suggests that deprivation of a valuable future is the 
‘primary’ thing that makes killing a person wrong. Because the autonomy-based concerns sketched just above 
also strike me as crucial to a full account of the wrongfulness of killing, I am skeptical of this strong claim.   
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made a large bet that you will die exactly a year from today, and wish to collect. In the life-
extending case, I would still be doing the right thing, just for the wrong reason.  
In §1 I argued that suffering makes the lives of animals go badly. I take the 
complement of this claim to be similarly plausible: other features can make those lives 
objectively good for animals to have. If part of the explanation of why it is wrong to kill a 
person is that it deprives the victim of a valuable future, and animals can have valuable 
futures, it would be perplexing if depriving animals of such futures could not similarly 
explain the wrongness of killing them. Features that might make animal futures valuable 
are not hard to sketch. Animals seem capable of pleasures as well as pains, and pleasant 
lives are typically better. Similarly, healthy animals typically have better lives than 
unhealthy animals, pack animals lead better lives if they have companions, etc.10
 
Consider a 
range of things that one might do to an animal: isolating it, amputating a healthy limb; 
purposely raising it on a diet lacking essential nutrients, etc. These sorts of acts seem 
wrong. A natural explanation is that they are wrong in part precisely because they worsen 
the future available to the animal.11  
One might object that having a valuable future depends upon one’s richly valuing 
one’s future, and that very few animals value their own futures in the relevant sense. 
However, the value of an activity or state for a person does not appear to depend either on 
their eventually valuing it, or on their being psychologically capable of valuing it (compare 
Marquis 1989, 195ff for relevant discussion). Consider an unswerving misogynist, 
dismissive of the contribution that his relationship with his wife makes to his life. This sort 
of blindness may make his life worse, but it needn’t erase the good constituted by the 
underlying relationship. If animals are incapable of valuing, this entails at most that they are 
in a situation analogous to that of such people.   
Further, the explanation that part of why killing is wrong is that it deprives the 
victim of a valuable future fits beautifully with the cow operations thought-experiments. In 
                                               
10 One should not conflate the most valuable life for an animal with the life that the animal tends to have in its 
‘natural’ evolutionary environment. Some species exemplify a high attrition pattern, bearing many young 
each breeding cycle, few of whom ordinarily survive to adulthood. This does not entail that dying young is 
part of the good life for an individual member of such a species. 
11 DeGrazia 2009, 161-2 expresses sympathy for both hedonistic and functional characterizations of the 
positive value of animal lives. He is, however, cautious concerning the relative ethical significance of 
painlessly killing animals. I take the cow operations cases to ameliorate the need for such caution.  
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the second thought-experiment, it is the preservation of a valuable cow future that explains 
why it is permissible to cause otherwise suffering in a way that would otherwise be 
wrongful. If the explanation that I have offered is right, then the ethical omnivore’s crucial 
premise – that while causing animal suffering is objectionable, causing animal death is not –
must be rejected.  
The explanation of the wrongness of killing that I have offered might suggest a 
different defense of the ethical omnivore. The defense points out that a pig raised for meat 
on a sufficiently humane farm may have a life that is on balance worth living. And were it 
not raised for meat, the pig would not exist at all. So, the ethical omnivore might suggest, 
raising the pig for meat is part of a plan that is good for the pig, and bad for no one. How 
could it be wrong?12 This defense raises serious theoretical controversies, usually discussed 
under the rubric of the ‘repugnant conclusion’.13 However, we can set these controversies 
aside, by focusing on an analogous case which does not involve the creation of new life.  
Suppose that a dog will be put down by the animal shelter unless Al adopts it. And 
suppose that Al only wants a dog in order to perform a painful and unnecessary operation 
on it, for his art film. Suppose finally that Al will be careful to give the dog a long and good 
life, such that he is reasonably sure that the dog’s life in his care will have been worth 
living, despite the pain and degraded capability produced by the operation. It seems to me 
that Al would act wrongly in performing the operation, despite the fact that this is part of 
an overall pattern of his action that has benefitted the dog. In general, no amount of good 
treatment of an animal can license one to substantially harm that animal simply for one’s 
own ends.14 But this is precisely what the ‘ethical’ pig farm by hypothesis does: it gives the 
pig a good life only to radically shorten that life by killing it, in order to serve the interests 
of the farmers. As I have just argued that killing an animal young harms the animal by 
depriving it of a valuable future, the ethical pig farm is morally objectionable for the same 
reason that Al’s operation would be.        
                                               
12 This objection is strongest when posed on behalf of the ethical omnivore. For one might reasonably deny (as 
Rachels 2011, 884 does) that factory farmed animals have lives worth living.  
13 The classic text is Parfit 1984, §131. For a review of the extensive literature, see Arrhenius et al 2010. 
14 Compare DeGrazia 2009, 162. While DeGrazia talks of ‘unnecessary’ harm, I think that we substantively 
agree: I do not think that the fact that Al would not adopt the dog without performing the operation makes 
doing so necessary in the sense that DeGrazia has in mind.   
McPherson A Case for Ethical Veganism 10 
If what I have argued to this point is correct, institutions that cause widespread 
animal suffering or death are thereby engaging in systematic wrongdoing. I claim that this 
conclusion supports adopting a vegan lifestyle. This is because there are constraints on how 
we may permissibly interact with morally objectionable institutions. This idea may be 
motivated by example: if one knows that a certain bar of chocolate is produced using child 
slave labor (as much of it is),15 it is very natural to take the purchase of that chocolate to be 
objectionable. The explanation of why will be both complex and controversial, and I will 
not do it justice here.16 However, an initial gloss would begin with the fact that in 
knowingly purchasing and enjoying the chocolate, you would be:  
(a) seeking to benefit from the wrongful acts of an institution (cocoa plantation child 
slavery), by enjoying the fruits of its wrongful activity, and 
(b) cooperating with the very plan that rationalizes the wrongful acts (cocoa slavers hope 
to gain from producing cocoa by using child slaves exactly because they rely on the 
willingness of consumers to purchase products made with this cocoa, whether out 
of indifference or ignorance).   
If this is the right preliminary explanation of the wrongness of knowingly purchasing slave 
chocolate, it will also apply to purchasing animal products produced by institutions that 
treat animals in seriously objectionable ways.   
One might think that the argument thus far is compatible with being an ethical 
vegetarian, who consumes animal products, but not animals, rather than a vegan. The 
leading thought suggesting such compatibility can be illustrated by an example. Producing 
milk is a normal and constant part of the life of cows. Indeed, cows have been bred to be 
                                               
15 Most of the world’s cocoa is produced in West Africa, on farms that employ large numbers of child 
laborers working in horrendous conditions, a significant proportion of whom are victims of human 
trafficking. For one brief journalistic treatment, see Orr 2006.  
16 Some philosophers content themselves with the thought that the conclusion is deeply plausible, without 
seeking a deep explanation (compare Rachels 1997). Many alternative models of explanation are possible 
here. On an ‘expressive’ view, the well-informed purchaser of the chocolate could be claimed to 
objectionably express acceptance of the oppression of the slave (compare Anderson 1993, Ch. 2). 
Alternatively, one might attempt to adapt to this case Scanlon’s proposal (2008, Ch. 4) that we should 
‘downgrade’ certain aspects of our relationships with wrongdoers. Finally, one might approach the problem 
in a consequentialist way. For example, Norcross 2004, 232-3 argues that, although the food system is not 
perfectly sensitive to consumer demand, if some large number of people ceased to buy animal products, there 
would be a marked decrease in animal killing. In such a pattern, each individual vegan has a tiny chance of 
being the individual whose choice happens to be causally efficacious. But if she is causally efficacious, she will 
save a huge number of animals at a stroke. A tiny chance of making such a large difference is morally 
important, according to Norcross. For an influential and structurally identical treatment of voting, see Parfit 
1984, 735; for an important argument against using this consequentialist reasoning to defend vegetarianism, 
see Budolfson ms. Finally, see Kutz 2000 for a detailed discussion of the ethical significance of relationships to 
objectionable institutions. 
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such that failing to milk them would be intensely cruel. It may seem that there could be no 
objection to drinking this milk, if the producing cows are treated well. After all, one does 
not harm the cows by taking their milk.  
While I take this point to be correct in the abstract, its application ignores the 
economic realities of (even ‘humane’) contemporary dairy farming. Robust milk 
production requires roughly annual calving. The majority of the calves (and almost all of 
the male calves) are typically raised to be killed early, and failing to raise them in this way 
would constitute an enormous drain on a farm’s resources. The economic logic of dairy 
farming thus requires the very early killing of most of the animals involved. But if killing 
animals is wrong for the sorts of reasons that I have sketched, then almost all existing 
‘humane’ dairy farms systematically engage in the wrongful treatment of animals. (Note 
that this explanation rests on facts about actual farming practices. It thus allows that there 
are conceivable farming practices whose animal products it would be unobjectionable to 
consume.) 
The argument of this section and the last began with the intuitive claim that it is 
wrong to set fire to a cat, and argued that once we accept that claim, it is very hard to resist 
an intuitive case for ethical veganism. This case entails that not only the typical North 
American diet, but also ‘ethical omnivorism’ and ‘ethical vegetarianism’ are typically 
morally objectionable. These are strikingly revisionary conclusions. In the next section, I 
show that this fact suggests an important methodological challenge to this intuitive case.  
 
3. The methodological challenge: one person’s modus ponens… 
 
In this section, I first argue that the case developed in the previous two sections can be 
plausibly re-interpreted as defending a conditional claim: that if Cat is true, we should 
accept ethical veganism. If true, this conditional claim forces us to revise our intuitive 
views about animal ethics. However, it is possible to challenge the conclusion that I draw 
from this argument, by questioning whether we must revise our intuitions in a pro-animal 
direction. (By pro-animal, I mean a view or judgment that requires us to treat animals well 
in some respect. I will also use anti-animal to describe views that do not require us to treat 
animals well). 
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Call an ethical account about a topic that vindicates our clear reflective intuitive 
judgments about the topic a conservative theory. Call the view that some conservative theory 
is defensible in animal ethics the conservative view. Conversely, call an account that requires 
that we abandon some intuitive judgment about a topic a revisionary theory, and the view 
that such a theory is required in animal ethics the revisionary view. Where they are available, 
conservative theories are prima facie highly attractive. After all, conservative theories are 
theories that are consistent with all of our clear reflective judgments about the subject 
matter. Revisionary theories, by contrast, require us to abandon something that we 
believe. They thus undertake a serious explanatory burden: to explain why we should 
dismiss the abandoned judgments.  
 The first thing to notice about the argument for ethical veganism of §§1-2 is that its 
force rests largely on the plausibility of intuitive judgments like Cat. If we rejected Cat and 
related intuitive judgments, the whole case that follows would be cast into doubt. To see 
this, consider an important competitor to my explanation of the wrongness of causing 
humans to suffer offered in §1. On this view, the wrongness of causing human suffering is 
explained by what it is like to suffer, together with the distinctive ‘moral status’ of the 
suffering human, where this status is claimed to be an essential feature of every human, 
whatever her individual capacities (compare e.g. Cohen 1986, 866). One important (I 
think near-decisive) problem for this sort of view is that it makes it very difficult to offer 
the most natural explanation of the wrongness of torturing animals for fun, dogfighting 
tournaments, dismembering live animals in slaughterhouses, etc. However, for someone 
initially unmoved by Cat, and these related cases, this would not appear to be a cost of the 
‘moral status’ explanation. 
 This has an important consequence. It suggests that my argument of §§1-2 can be 
partially but accurately represented as follows:  
Cat  It is wrong to pour gasoline on a cat and light it on fire 
Conditional If it is wrong to pour gasoline on a cat and light it on fire, then (inter 
alia) it is wrong to drink a glass of milk 
Not-Milk It is wrong to drink a glass of milk 
This representation follows from the suggestion just made that my argument can be 
separated into an intuitive appeal to Cat, and an argument for Conditional. But this point 
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suggests an important challenge: why cannot one simply offer the ‘modus tollens’ version 
of this argument? 
Milk  It is not wrong to drink a glass of milk 
Conditional If it is wrong to pour gasoline on a cat and light it on fire, then (inter 
alia) it is wrong to drink a glass of milk 
Not-Cat It is not wrong to pour gasoline on a cat and light it on fire 
Like Cat, Milk has been chosen to serve as a vivid proxy for a cluster of related and (for 
most of us) highly plausible judgments.17 Cat stands in for judgments espousing the 
wrongness of engaging in various acts of cruelty to animals. Milk stands in for judgments 
espousing the permissibility of our ordinary everyday use of animal products.  
The availability of the modus tollens version of the argument suggests that (even if 
otherwise sound) what my argument from §1-2 most clearly shows is that the conservative 
view of animal ethics is indefensible: we must give up either Milk (and related judgments) 
or Cat (and related judgments).  
It is worth noting that even if the case developed in §§1-2 is best understood as an 
argument against conservatism, it answers an important sort of worry that one might have 
about ethical veganism. This worry is that philosophical reasoning may not be epistemically 
powerful enough to successfully challenge something as deeply embedded in our practices 
as using animal products. Using animal products has been taken for granted as permissible 
by virtually the entirety of humanity throughout history. Could philosophical reasoning 
really entitle us to the conclusion that such an activity is morally wrong? One can partially 
answer this worry by pointing to the manifest soundness of various revisionary arguments 
offered against deeply engrained racism, sexism or homophobia. However, the case against 
conservatism suggests another retort: it shows that any defensible set of ethical beliefs 
about animals will have to abandon some highly intuitive theses, on pain of inconsistency. 
Ethical veganism is revisionary, to be sure, but so is the view that it would have been 
acceptable for me to test your intuitions by actually setting fire to a cat. If Cat and Milk 
cannot both be maintained, ethical veganism does not appear to be vulnerable simply in 
virtue of its revisionary character. Rather, from this point on, we need to assess the case 
                                               
17 Note that I say most of us. Some people presumably think that there is nothing wrong with setting fire to a 
cat, and a good deal more think that there is something wrong with drinking milk. However, I take both 
groups to be well outside of the intuitive mainstream. 
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for retaining Cat rather than Milk, (or vice-versa). If she can force us to this choice point, 
the ethical vegan has made crucial dialectical progress.    
Call the thesis that we must give up either Milk (and related judgments) or Cat 
(and related judgments) The Tension. (In what follows I will sometimes describe Cat and 
Milk as being ‘inconsistent’ or ‘in conflict’. These should always be read as references to 
The Tension, and not as claims about meaning or logical form). This problem is not unique 
to my argument for veganism. Rather, I suspect that it will apply to any revisionary ethical 
argument that focuses on developing plausible ethical explanations grounded by intuitively 
powerful judgments (what I earlier called the ‘intuitive-explanatory’ method). The fact 
that some of the strongest pro-animal arguments have this form raises a pressing 
methodological question: how should we adjudicate this sort of conflict in our intuitive 
judgments? I now turn to that question.    
 
4. The methodological implications of revisionism 
 
I have just argued that the failure of the conservative position leaves us with an important 
and neglected question: should we resolve The Tension by abandoning Cat (and related 
judgments), or Milk (and related judgments)? Backing up a little, we can ask a 
methodological question: what is a philosophically principled way of resolving The 
Tension? This section is dedicated to addressing the second, methodological question. I will 
briefly consider and reject three salient strategies for resolving The Tension. The first is to 
appeal to the greater intuitive plausibility of one over the other resolution. The second 
strategy is to appeal to systematic normative ethical theorizing as a route to resolving The 
Tension. Finally, the third strategy seeks to resolve The Tension be defeating a non-moral 
presupposition of our belief in Cat. I suggest reasons for pessimism about all of these, 
arguing that the only philosophically satisfying resolution to The Tension requires appealing 
to a debunking argument that undercuts the intuitive plausibility of one of the inconsistent 
clusters of claims.  
  The first strategy is to attempt to ascertain which of the inconsistent claims can be 
abandoned with the least reflective implausibility. For example, perhaps with the case for 
Conditional in place, the ‘modus ponens’ case against Milk just seems more plausible than 
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the ‘modus tollens’ case against Cat (or vice versa). One initial worry about this variant of 
the strategy is the difficulty of developing a persuasive argument against someone inclined 
on the same basis to resolve The Tension in the other direction.  
The intuitive strategy can be developed in two more interesting ways. First, this 
strategy can be developed in the spirit of G. E. Moore’s notorious arguments against the 
skeptic and idealist. To begin, notice that Conditional is supported by the conjunction of a 
whole series of intuitive and explanatory claims. It collapses if any one of them is rejected. 
One might then ask, in a Moorean spirit: am I more certain in the conjunction of Cat and 
Milk, or in the complicated conjunction that underwrites Conditional? One difficulty with 
this strategy is that it threatens to prove too much. After all, this form of argument, if 
legitimate, would seem to threaten almost any multi-premise intuitive-explanatory 
philosophical argument for a revisionary conclusion. A diagnosis of the difficulty is that 
Moore’s strategy should not be used to support just any plausible claim. Rather, Moore 
typically appealed to the most plausible deliverances of common sense, like “I have a hand”, 
or “things move”. It is implausible that either Cat or Milk deserve a like status as “Moorean 
facts”.18  
 A more promising variant of the intuitive strategy would seek to show that one of 
the conflicting sets of intuitive judgments is linked by an explanatory structure to a much 
wider set of our judgments than the other. If one could show this, then one would have a 
principled way of defending one resolution of The Tension over the other. However, I am 
not sure how to make such a strategy compelling, for reasons best illustrated by example.  
In one of the few discussions of animal ethics that notice roughly the ‘modus 
tollens’ problem, Alastair Norcross deploys this strategy.19 Norcross argues that we should 
retain the pro-animal judgments because this permits us to offer the most plausible account 
of our obligations to ‘marginal’ humans (humans who lack robust rational capacities). 
However, this part of Norcross’ argument faces two structural difficulties. The first 
problem is that ‘marginal’ humans are a notoriously hard ethical case: it is extremely 
                                               
18 See my 2009 for a detailed discussion of the use of Moorean arguments in ethics, that supports the points 
made here. 
19 2004, §§3-6. Norcross’s version of the competing arguments also stacks the deck, taking the premise “it is 
not wrong to support factory farming” as his opponent’s starting point. But that is wildly less intuitive than 
the claim about milk that I consider. 
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difficult to develop an explanatorily satisfying theory in this area. It is thus unclear how 
costly it is to fail to provide a satisfying theory of these cases. Second, Norcross’ own 
theory also makes highly counterintuitive claims about these cases. For example, it entails 
that I would do something roughly as seriously wrong by setting fire to a cat as I would by 
setting fire to my infant son.  
I take Norcross to have chosen the most promising case for his strategy. ‘Marginal’ 
humans are arguably distinctively relevant to animal ethics, because some marginal humans 
have capacities that are at least roughly analogous to those of relevant non-human animals. 
However, because the most promising analogous cases are independently so vexed, it 
appears unlikely that this strategy can bear fruit. 
 Note next that, as I have set it out, our inconsistent set is explanatorily lopsided: in 
developing my case for The Tension, I basically began with Cat, and then spelled out an 
explanatory case for ethical veganism. By contrast, it may not be clear what an 
explanatorily satisfying argument against Cat would look like. However, this is an artifact 
of my presentation. There are a variety of systematic normative theories that imply that we 
are not required to treat animals well. These constitute candidate explanations of the falsity 
of Cat. 
 This might suggest that we should resolve The Tension by looking to systematic 
normative theory. This approach is well-worn in the literature. For example, Peter 
Singer’s pro-animal view (1977) is arguably most compelling when embedded within his 
utilitarian framework, while William Baxter’s case that animals only matter if and when we 
care about them (1974) is grounded in a simple contractarian ethic. Defending such global 
theories is admittedly hard, but the broader explanatory power promised by such theories 
might appear to be a way to make progress when forced to choose between revisionary 
claims in a case like ours.  
While I am a cheerleader for systematic normative theorizing, I worry that here 
the apparent aid offered by such theorizing is probably illusory. To see why, consider 
classical utilitarianism: this consists in a theory about what value consists in (a positive 
balance of pleasure vs. pain), and a structural theory about how we should respond to value 
(by performing acts that maximize it, wherever it might be located). Such a theory comes 
close to forcing a pro-animal conclusion upon us. However, many of the heirs of classical 
McPherson A Case for Ethical Veganism 17 
utilitarianism have tended to find only its consequentialist maximizing structure 
distinctively compelling. From J. S. Mill onward, many have tended to abandon simple 
hedonism about value. Instead, they have adopted pluralistic theories of value, largely 
driven by concern to capture our intuitive judgments about value. However, it is simple 
hedonism about value, and not consequentialism, that is essential to the classical utilitarian 
case in defense of animals. To see this, note that a consequentialist might argue that only 
the pleasures and pains of beings with a moral status lacked by most non-human animals 
should enter into the maximizing calculus. The natural way to determine whether this 
theory is more or less plausible than classical utilitarianism is by appealing to the very 
intuitive judgments about animals that The Tension has cast into doubt. If this is so, we 
should not expect appeal to utilitarian theoretical structure to help us to independently 
resolve The Tension.   
The same sensitivity to local intuitive judgments cuts against the force of seemingly 
animal-unfriendly systematic theories. To see this, consider the work of T. M. Scanlon, 
arguably the leading contemporary contractualist. Scanlon is careful to argue that his theory 
can be adapted (either via restricting its scope or via trusteeship hypotheses) to protect 
animals (1998, 177-184). Again, the structure of the theory is left intact, while its 
distinctive force to adjudicate our debate about animals has been basically eliminated.  
These examples suggest two points. First, pro- or anti-animal modules can 
typically be grafted onto the central structure of most important normative theories. 
Second, the main reasons for accepting or rejecting those grafts will arise from their local 
intuitive-explanatory plausibility: how well they vindicate our careful thinking about our 
ethical relationships to non-human animals. If this is true, then it is not clear that appeal to 
systematic normative theory is a promising way to adjudicate The Tension. 
In discussing these examples, I have presupposed the arguably dominant mode of 
normative theorizing: one that gives a distinctively privileged and robust methodological 
role to our intuitive moral judgments. There are important methodological alternatives in 
normative ethics, typically grounded in broadly metaethical commitments. Consider two 
examples. First, Christine Korsgaard advocates a methodology in ethics that involves a kind 
of ‘practical conceptual analysis’ that is allegedly called for by the practical problem that we 
confront (2003, 115-6). Second, Richard Boyd (1997) develops a metaethic that diminishes 
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the usual epistemic role of intuitive judgments, and suggests that some seemingly 
intractable moral conflict may be explained by the presence of indeterminacy in the moral 
facts. Discussing the methodological significance of such theories carefully would exceed 
the scope of this paper, so I set them aside here (or discussion, see my 2012).   
A third possible strategy is to seek to resolve The Tension by defeating a non-
moral presupposition of one of the inconsistent theses. A version of this strategy that 
attacks the presupposition that animals can suffer is the heart of perhaps the most familiar 
anti-animal philosophical strategy. Historically, the claim that animals can suffer has been 
most famously challenged by René Descartes. On Descartes’ view, animals are just 
complicated machines with no inner lives: just as there is nothing that it would be like to be 
a pulley or a lever, there is nothing that it would be like to be a cow.20 More recently, the 
assumption of animal suffering has been most carefully challenged by Peter Carruthers. 
Carruthers argued that while animals can perhaps have pain, they do not have conscious 
experience of pain, which he argues is the morally relevant property (1992, Ch. 8).21 These 
claims promise to ground a revisionary anti-animal view, because they would seem to 
entail that setting fire to a cat is no more objectionable than setting fire to a bicycle.  
The presupposition-defeating strategy is attractive because it avoids the potential 
dialectical stalemate threatened under the previous two strategies. If Carruthers’ claims 
about animal capacities could be defended,22 The Tension could seemingly be resolved 
‘from the outside’. This is because the plausibility of Cat would not survive conviction that 
there is nothing that it is like to be a cat.23  
This very feature of the presupposition-defeating strategy should leave us 
philosophically dissatisfied. The problem is that convincing us that animals cannot suffer 
resolves The Tension, but leaves the deeper intuitive inconsistency intact. To see this, note 
                                               
20 For example, see his letter to Mersenne, 1991 [1640], 148. For an interpretation that challenges elements 
of this standard reading of Descartes on animal experience, see Thomas 2006. 
21 Carruthers has since suggested (in his 2004 and elsewhere) that animals may count as suffering in virtue of 
finding their pains awful, even if they lack phenomenal consciousness.  
22 I take this task to be nearly hopeless, but that is an argument for another day. 
23 This oversimplifies. For example, if the newer Carruthers view mentioned in n. 21 above were correct, 
animal suffering can matter even if it is not conscious. This shows that in order to resolve our inconsistency, 
empirical claims about animal capacities will still need to be wedded to controversial normative claims; in this 
case, claims about what exactly normatively significant suffering requires.  
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that prior to being convinced by Carruthers (or whomever) we would presumably accept 
not just Cat and Milk, but the following conditional claims:  
Cat*  If animals were capable of suffering, then it would be wrong to pour 
gasoline on a cat and light it on fire 
Milk* If animals were capable of suffering, it would not be wrong to drink a 
glass of milk 
My argument for Conditional in §1-2 can be adapted to show these to be inconsistent just 
as Cat and Milk are. Becoming convinced that animals cannot suffer may defeat our belief 
in Cat, and hence resolve the claimed ethical inconsistency between Cat and Milk. 
However, it leaves the deeper inconsistency – between Cat* and Milk* – intact.   
Philosophical ethics does not merely aim to tell us what to do in practical cases. It 
aims to explain why we should do those things. Because of this explanatory ambition, an 
animal ethics that leaves this deeper inconsistency untouched is philosophically unsatisfying. 
Thus, it seems to me that the presupposition-defeating strategy (like the Moorean strategy 
mentioned above) is crucially philosophically incomplete. The intuitive and normative 
theoretic strategies discussed earlier in this section do not have this problem. But they have 
a related shortcoming. They take our incoherent judgments at face value, and seek to move 
from those judgments to a more coherent set. But they do nothing to explain why those 
judgments are incoherent in the first place. This point partially explains why on both of 
these views, there is basically nothing one can say to someone who has thought hard about 
the cases, and come to the opposite conclusion than you have. Both of you have 
successfully moved to a more coherent set of beliefs.   
We can improve on this state of affairs. The discussion of §§1-3 suggests that we 
cannot have a conservative view that avoids The Tension. If this is so, we should aim to 
develop an account that explains the existence of The Tension. What would such an 
explanation look like? Given the nature of The Tension, I think that it can only take the 
form of a debunking argument, which explains why we are illicitly tempted by either Milk or 
Cat. Let me very briefly say what I mean by a debunking argument. I will follow Guy 
Kahane (2011) in suggesting that debunking arguments provide alleged undermining 
defeaters for the beliefs that they target. That is, rather than providing positive evidence 
that a belief is false, they aim to discredit the evidence that we take ourselves to have for 
the truth of that belief. If the debunking argument for abandoning one of our two 
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inconsistent judgments is much stronger than that for the other, this gives us a principled 
way of resolving The Tension. In the next section, I argue that this is the case.   
 
5. Debunking intuitive judgments about animals 
 
In this section, I set out the most plausible debunking argument available to cast doubt on 
our belief in Cat and Milk respectively. The debunking argument for belief in Cat that I 
consider appeals to the idea that this belief arises from illegitimate anthropomorphization. 
The argument for debunking Milk argues that this claim arises due to a kind of 
rationalization. I will argue that the most plausible debunking argument for Cat is 
substantially weaker than that for Milk, and that this gives us grounds to prefer the pro-
animal resolution of The Tension. 
Debunking arguments have a controversial place in ethical theorizing. On the one 
hand, some of the most important figure in the history of ethics and political philosophy – 
like Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche – can be understood as partly attempting to debunk 
some of the prevailing ethical views of their day. Further, whatever you think of these 
figures, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that across large stretches of human history, many 
prevailing beliefs about the ethical status of slavery, political organization, race, class, 
gender, and sexual orientation are reasonably described as the products of ideology, in 
need of debunking. On the other hand, debunking arguments play a limited role in 
contemporary ethics, and this is perhaps in part because they can appear to be 
problematically blunt philosophical implements, too easy to deploy indiscriminately against 
anything one doesn’t like. (As in the sophomoric parody: “Dude, you can’t trust your 
moral judgments; you just believe them because The Man wants you to.”)  
There are thus very hard questions about where exactly debunking arguments have 
force, and how much force they have. However, if my argument in the paper thus far is 
granted, ours is a best-case scenario for deploying such arguments. This is for two reasons. 
First, I have argued that there is an inconsistency between two groups of our intuitive 
judgments (represented by Cat and Milk). Second, I have argued that an explanatorily 
fulfilling resolution of that inconsistency must include an explanation of why one of these 
groups of intuitive judgments is less credible than it initially appears. This is exactly the 
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context in which debunking arguments should be most powerful, because it is a situation 
where only such an argument can provide a view in animal ethics that helps us to fully 
understand why we should resolve the tension in our beliefs in one way or another.  
I cannot consider every possible candidate debunking argument here. Instead, I 
will focus on what I take to be the single most plausible argument available to each side. 
First consider what I take to be the most plausible debunking argument on behalf of the 
anti-animal view. This is the thesis that belief in Cat, and related claims, are the result of a 
tendency to anthropomorphize companion animals. The debunker points out that if we 
exchanged Cat for a similar claim involving rats or mice, for example, the intuitive 
revulsion will be much lessened. Part of the typical culture of our relations to companion 
animals (and perhaps part of what tends to make those relationships so emotionally 
rewarding for the humans involved) is a tendency to treat the animals as if they had human-
like psychologies. However, while it may be good for our emotional lives to treat animals 
this way, belief that they have such a psychology does not survive reflection. For example, 
the temptation to blame Fluffles for destroying your houseplants ‘in a fit of pique’ should 
recede when one asks oneself if it really makes sense to take the Strawsonian ‘participant 
attitude’ towards her behavior.24 Given Fluffles’ nature, it may make sense to protect your 
remaining plants, or to attempt to train her, but it does not make sense to treat her as an 
agent apt for blame or punishment.  
If our intuitive acceptance of Cat and similar pro-animal intuitions is explained by 
mechanisms that serve this anthropomorphizing tendency, the justificatory force of those 
intuitions is undercut. Rather than being responses to the moral significance of the relevant 
animals, these intuitions are being generated by emotional processes insensitive to such 
moral significance. This hypothesis predicts that our intuitions are less vulnerable to this 
sort of distortion when we consider animals (or especially types of animals) to which we 
have not formed emotional ties. In these cases, our intuitions about the significance of 
animal suffering are weaker. This in turn suggests that The Tension may be partly 
explained as a result of such anthropomorphization, and that the intuitive force of Cat 
should thus be discounted.  
                                               
24 Compare Strawson 1962. In conversation, some people have remained committed to their 
anthropomorphization, claiming, for example, that their dog knew exactly what she was doing, when she 
chewed up dad’s shoes to punish him for being late, and that she was blameworthy for doing so. 
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How effective is this debunking argument? There is a grain of truth in it, but only a 
grain. Our intuitions about causing suffering to companion animals are certainly typically 
clearer and more vivid than those concerning other animals. However, there is a plausible 
alternative explanation of the asymmetry that inverts the debunking argument. Consider 
the familiar idea that it is much easier to press a button, detonating a bomb that will kill 
far-off persons, than it is to bring oneself to kill a person with one’s bare hands. There is a 
clear explanation for this: in the bare-handed case, the suffering of the victim – and its 
moral significance – is much more psychologically salient than in the button-pressing case. 
It would be wrongheaded to presume that our intuitions are much more reliable in the 
emotionally ‘cool’ button-pressing case than in the bare-handed case. This suggests a 
plausible competing explanation for the debunker’s data. Our intuitions about the moral 
significance of the suffering of companion animals are typically stronger than our intuitions 
about animals whose lives are less familiar to us. However, this may simply be because in 
the former case, the morally significant suffering is more psychologically vivid to us, in 
light of our actual and imaginative familiarity with the animals in question.25  
The most promising debunking argument against our belief in Milk and related 
judgments argues that these are a product of what I will call status quo rationalization.26 A 
belief is subject to status quo rationalization just in case that belief is required to vindicate 
the goals and behaviors of the believer, and of others that the believer identifies as 
members of her moral community. Consider as an example a member of a slave-owning 
family in the antebellum South, for whom owning and using slaves is a deeply embedded 
part of everyday life, and the life of those he is closest to. It is easy to predict that other 
things being equal, such a person will tend not to believe that slavery is a moral 
monstrosity. This is because taking oneself and those one identifies most closely with to be 
doing something seriously morally wrong makes for a particularly uncomfortable form of 
                                               
25 This explanation can grant some debunking of the processes that guide our intuitions: perhaps cuteness and 
ugliness play some role. For example, most of us are probably less apt to be sensitive to the suffering of star 
moles or pangolins than we are to that of baby seals or penguins. However, these sorts of differences can be 
adequately managed by the intuitive-explanatory method, exactly because they are unlikely to survive 
extended reflection. 
26 Christian Coons suggests another important debunking strategy to me in conversation. On my view, there 
is nothing intrinsically wrong with drinking milk (e.g. I suggested in §3 that there are possible morally 
unobjectionable dairies). Drinking milk is only wrong when and because it connects to the maltreatment of 
animals in the right way. The relevant version of Milk is thus that it is not wrong to drink milk produced in ways 
that maltreat animals. And there our intuitions may not be so clear.   
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cognitive dissonance: very few people can comfortably self-identify as morally bad. 
Sometimes this sort of cognitive dissonance is a catalyst for moral improvement. However, 
the more deeply embedded a behavior is in one’s life – the more convenient or beneficial 
or pleasant; the more unquestioned by one’s peers, etc. – the more likely that cognitive 
dissonance will be resolved by one’s values changing to rationalize one’s behavior, and that 
of those one identifies with.27  
Applied to the tension between Cat and Milk, the debunking argument goes like 
this: drinking milk and consuming other animal products is deeply embedded in the lives of 
almost all of our communities. Because of this, status quo rationalization is a highly salient 
explanation for why we take such consumption to be permissible (and hence, why we are 
inclined to accept Milk). On the other hand, singling out companion animals for torture is 
not a part of our culture in the same way. Because rationalization is apt to occur where it is 
needed to block obvious moral tensions, and because the moral tension between accepting 
Cat and our ordinary lives is not at all obvious, we would not predict such status quo 
rationalization to affect beliefs about setting fire to cats (except perhaps in philosophers 
who notice the tension).28 This suggests that status quo rationalization is well-placed to 
explain The Tension: Milk but not Cat can be explained away as a product of status quo 
rationalization.  
The availability of status quo rationalization as a potential explanation for an 
intuitive ethical judgment does not by itself debunk that judgment. Consider an example: 
the prohibition on wanton killing of humans is beneficial for me, and abandoning it would 
threaten some very powerful and central assumptions that my peer group holds about the 
moral asymmetry between themselves and serial killers, for example. The crucial contrast 
between this case and Milk is that in the wanton killing case, our moral beliefs are 
overdetermined. It may be true that status quo rationalization plays some role in bolstering 
our belief in the wrongness of wanton killing, but those beliefs also fit well with almost all 
                                               
27 Related rationalizing mechanisms presumably also underwrite the distorting tendencies of partiality in our 
moral thinking. For example, we tend to think that even someone who would attempt to be scrupulously fair 
should probably not sit in judgment on his own case.  Compare Rawls 1951, 182 and Sinnott-Armstrong 
2006, 195-7. 
28 Interestingly, Herzog 2010, 35-7 cites studies that suggest that childhood cruelty to animals is extremely 
common, admitted by a third to a half of all adults. However, Herzog suggests that such behavior may be 
understood by the actors themselves as transgressive, and this may explain why there is little pressure to 
rationalize it as permissible.  
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of our core moral reasoning. Milk is different in this respect. The argument of §§1-4 
suggests that (a) Milk is part of a relatively explanatorily isolated set of judgments, and (b) 
Milk is (unlike the wanton killing judgment) in conflict with other plausible moral 
judgments. I suggested above that this is exactly the situation in which debunking 
arguments have the most dramatic force.   
I have argued that the most plausible debunking explanation of the other 
inconsistent judgment – Cat – is weak. I have now suggested that the intuitions 
represented by Milk can be plausibly explained by appeal to the mechanism of status-quo 
rationalization. This suggests good grounds for taking status quo rationalization to be an 
undercutting defeater for the evidential status of Milk and related judgments. If this is 
right, the argument of this section has put us in a position to resolve The Tension identified 
in §3: debunking arguments give us some explanatorily satisfying grounds for preferring 




In this paper, I have developed a case for a strongly revisionary view in animal ethics: 
ethical veganism. I began by setting out what I called an intuitive-explanatory case for this 
view. I suggested that this argument can be best understood as supporting a conditional 
argument, that connects accepting one plausible claim (Cat – that it is wrong to pour 
gasoline on a cat and light it on fire), to rejecting another (Milk – that it is not wrong to 
drink a glass of milk). The problem is that one can run a reverse argument retaining the 
same conditional thesis, but this time holding Milk fixed and concluding that Cat must be 
false. I then rejected three strategies for addressing the question of which direction of the 
argument should be preferred: attempting to adjudicate the intuitive force of the 
competing premises, appeal to systematic normative theories, and appeal to evidence 
against a crucial non-moral presupposition of one of the arguments. I argued that the only 
philosophically satisfying resolution of the conflict would appeal to an argument that 
debunks our belief in one of the crucial conflicting claims. Finally, I argued that one such 
argument – the claim that Milk is dubitable because a likely result of status quo 
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rationalization – is more powerful than the most salient alternative. I conclude that this 
gives us some reason to favor a strongly pro-animal view in animal ethics.        
I want to close by emphasizing the modesty of my conclusion. First, I claim that 
considering relevant debunking arguments should lead us to favor a pro-animal resolution 
to this question. This is very different from saying that we have sufficient evidence to be 
justified in believing that it is wrong to drink milk, for example. If I am right, the most 
defensible substantive view about animal ethics supports ethical veganism to a greater degree 
than it does the status quo, or a variety of more modest pro-animal views. However, that 
does not entail that we have sufficient evidence to justify believing ethical veganism to be 
the ethical truth: I am inclined to think that given the difficulty of the case we may not. 
This does not, however, undercut the practical significance of this argument for ethical 
veganism. If the wrongness of an action is better supported by the evidence than its 
permissibility, this surely should lead reasonable deliberators to refrain from performing it, 
other things being equal.29 
Second, this argument does not address one of the main philosophical cases for the 
anti-animal position: if animals cannot suffer, then nothing that I have said here suggests 
that there is an objection to the anti-animal revisionist. As I argued in §4, the question of 
whether the empirical presuppositions of our intuitive ethical judgments are correct is 
independent of our best understanding about how to make those judgments coherent. 
Nonetheless, I think the argument offered in this paper is important both 
substantively and methodologically. Substantively, the conclusion that veganism is better 
supported by the evidence than the alternatives given the assumption that animals can suffer 
is independently striking. It also highlights the ethical importance of empirical investigation 
of animal capacity to suffer. This is not because of the plausibility of the no-suffering view, 
which is minimal. Rather, it is because such investigation will inform how far the scope of 
the ethical vegan argument extends. Between oysters and cows is a continuum of animals 
with increasingly sophisticated cognitive capacities. The question of exactly which of those 
animals can suffer is an extremely difficult question that my argument suggests is strikingly 
ethically relevant.   
                                               
29 Here I make a modest point; in doing so, I seek to finesse the real complications that arise from the need to 
make decisions under moral uncertainty. See Ross 2006 and Sepielli 2009 for two discussions of this problem 
in its more general form. 
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Methodologically, I take my argument to provide an important model for 
defending revisionary views in applied ethics. Arguments for revisionary ethical views face 
strong dialectical burdens. Animal ethics is a case in point: in virtue of the counterintuitive 
conclusions of radical pro-animal arguments, it can always seem reasonable to reject them 
by rejecting one or another premise of such arguments. The worry is that the revisionist is 
by definition asking us to reject something highly plausible, so why not one of their 
premises! The argument of §§4-5 seeks to answer this worry. At least in cases with 
conditions similar to the animal ethics case (inter alia, a striking tension and detachability 
from structural claims in normative ethics), debunking arguments may have a more central 
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